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INTRODUCTION

Colorado expects its population to grow by roughly one million residents
every decade from now until 2040.' By then, the state's population will approach eight million.! If Colorado's water supply continues to develop at its
current rate, the projected rise in population will "inevitably lead to a large transfer of water out of agriculture resulting in significant loss of agricultural lands
and potential harm to the environment."' The greatest demand will likely be
from municipal and industrial users who, under moderate assumptions of future water demand and successful completion of identified supply projects, will
face a shortfall of 390,000 acre feet per year in 2050.'
Some have called for greater use of market-based approaches to assist in
reallocating water among different users and uses.' Classical economic theory
suggests that markets must be competitive to achieve optimal allocation of water.' But competitiveness assumes the presence of certain market conditions.
This article explores two of these conditions: well-defined property rights and
transactions costs.
For water markets to work, property rights to water must be well defined.'
The prior appropriations doctrine is adept at describing use-basedrightsin water.' These proverbial "sticks" in the bundle that compose a water right specify
a point of diversion, the beneficial use to which the water is applied, the place
of use, and the rate of and/or amount of the diversion. Yet, the most important
stick in the bundle - the quantity of water transferrable to another use- is often
poorly defined under the historic consumptive use doctrine.! Two recent Colorado Supreme Court ("Supreme Court" or "Court") decisions, Burlington
1.

COLo.

3.

Gov'r, STATE DEMOGRAPHY OFFICE, POPULATION
avidable at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/DOLA-

DEP'T. OF LOCAL

FORECAST 2000-2040 (2012),
Main/CBON/1251593346834.
2. Id.

CoLo. WATER CONSERVATION BD., STATEWIDE WATER SUPPLY INrrIATiVE ES-1

(2010), aiulableat http://cwcb.state.co.us/water-management/water-supply planning/Documents/
SWS12010/SWS12010.pdf Ihereinafter SWSI 20101.
4. Id.at 5-28.
5. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, WVATER MARKETING, THE NEXT
GENERATION (1997); K. William Easter, Mark W. Rosegrant & Ariel Dinar, FormalandInformal Markets for Water: Institutions, Performance, and Constrainls, 14 WORLD BANK REs.
OBSERVER 99 (1999); Ronald C. Grillin & Shih-Hsun Hsu, The Potential for Water Market
Eliciency when Instrean Flows Have Value, 75 AMt.J. AGRIC. ECON. 292 (1993); Charles W.

Howe, Dennis R. Schurmeier & Douglas Shaw, Jr., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation:
The Potentialfor Water Markets, 22 WATER RES. RESEARCH 439 (1986); Ronald A. Kaiser &
Laura M. Phillips, Dividingthe Waters: WaterMarketingasa ConflictResolution Strategyin the
Edwards Aquifer Region, 38 NAT. RES.J. 411 (1998). But see,Joseph W. Dellapenna, Markets
for Water: The to Put the Myth to Rest, 131 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 33, 35 (2005)
(concluding that water is the "prime example of a public good for which prices cannot be set in a
marketplace.").
6. E.g., Thomas C. Brown, Trends in Water Market Activity and Pice in the Western
UnitedStates, 42 WATER RES. RESEARCH 1, 2 (2006).
7. E.g., BRUCE AYLWARD E AL., THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER FOR AGRICULTURAL,
DOMESTIC AND INDUSTRIAL USES: A GLOBAL COMPILATION OF EcONO.MIC STUDIES AND

MARKET PRIcEs 1 (20 10);Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance ofGettingNames R&ht The
Myth of Markets for Water,317 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 317, 327 (2000).

8. Nicole L.Johnson, Propertywithout Possession,24 YALEJ. ON REG. 205, 219-30 (2007).
9. E.g., Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Public 14Vter-Pivate Water: Antispeculation, Water
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Ditch Reservoir& Land Company v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation District
("BurlingtonDitch") o and In re Water Rihts of Central Colorado Water Conservancy District v. Greeley ("Jones Ditch")," underscore the dramatic results
of failure to properly quantify water rights.
In addition to well-defined property rights, low transactions costs are another prerequisite for the operation of competitive markets." Colorado, perhaps. more than any other Western state, scrutinizes transfers of water rights in
order to prevent injury to other users." Satisfying the burden of proof is a costly
endeavor for an applicant; requiring engineers, lawyers, and other experts."
The maintenance and protection of vested rights, while undoubtedly a necessary inquiry in a change in water rights case, can introduce transactions costs
that inhibit additional market activity." In Burlington Ditch and Jones Ditch,
the Supreme Court discussed ditch-wide quantification (also referred to as system-wide quantification) of historical consumptive use. The ditch-wide quantification method has the potential to reduce transactions costs vis-i-vis traditional parcel-specific quantification. But did the Court offer enough clarity for
ditch-wide quantifications to become the favored method of quantification?
What are the realities of such a quantification system?
Section I of this article offers a brief overview of the history and development of Colorado's agricultural water rights, including a discussion of the Supreme Court's holdings in Burlington Ditch and Jones Ditch, two key cases
from which to draw lessons related to property rights and transactions costs.
Section II offers analysis of these concepts, with particular attention on the role
of senior agricultural rights in meeting Colorado's future water supply demands
and the importance of ditch-wide quantification as a component of a broader
strategy to develop functioning water markets. Section III examines practical
issues associated with the implementation of the ditch-wide quantification
method, and provides preliminary suggestions on how to address these issues.

Reallocation,andI-gh PlainsA&M, LLC v. Southeastem Colorado Water ConservancyDisrict,
10 U. DENv. VATER L. REv. 1, 3 (2006); Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: 7he Semicommons
ofFuidPropertyRights, 50 ARiz. L. REv. 445, 470 (2008).

10. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro. Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256
P.3d 645 (Colo. 2011).
11. In re Water Rights of Cent. Colo. Watef Conservancy Dist., 147 P.3d 9 (Colo. 2006).
12. Eg., AYLWARD ET AL., supra note 7, at 1; Bonnie G. Colby, Transactions Costs and
E/Iiciencyin Western Water Allocation, 72 AM.J. AGRIc. ECON. 1184, 1184 (1990).

13. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3)(a) (2012) (A change of water rights will be approved
under the Water Right Determination and Adjudication Act of 1969 only if the change will not
injuriously affect other adjudicated water rights). As used in this article, transfer or change of water
right involves a change as defined in COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(5); see also Santa Fe Trail
Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53 (Colo. 1999) (discussing the standards
for a change in use proceeding); Colby, supra note 12, at 1190-91.
14. E.g., PETER D. NICHOLS ET AL., WATER AND GROWTH IN COLORADO: A REVIEw OF
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUEs 143, 145 (2001).
15. Id. at 145 (discussing the perceived preference of municipalities to acquire additional
supply through the importation of foreign water which may avoid the costs associated with a
change in use proceeding); Charles W. Howe & Christopher Goemans, Water Transfers and
Their Impacts: Lessons from Three Colorado Water Markets, 39 J. AM.

WATER

RES. AsS'N

1055, 1058-59 (2003).
16. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro. Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256
P.3d 645, 675-76 (Colo. 2011); Cent. Colo. Water ConservancyDist., 147 P.3d at 19-20.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. COLORADO'S SENIOR AGRICULTURAL RIGHTS
Municipal water providers seek to acquire water rights historically used in
agriculture, particularly rights represented by shares in mutual ditch companies
that often have senior priority." Such rights satisfy a key requirement for municipalities: certainty of supply." Ironically, the anticipated certainty of supply
that makes these rights so valuable also gives rise to great uncertainty when
courts attempt to quantify the historical consumptive use associated with such
rights, many of which were decreed more than a century ago."
The adjudication statutes of 1879 and 1881 decreed many of the most senior water rights in Colorado." The statutes required applicants to submit a
"statement of claim."" Statements of claim included the
name of the structure; a legal description of the point of diversion and location
of the length of the ditch; the ditch's width, depth, and carrying capacity in
cubic feet per second; the name of the stream supplying the ditch; the date on
which work on the ditch commenced; the uses of water; the name of the
owner; and an accompanying plat map showing the stream and the ditch from
its point of diversion to the terminus of the claim."
Like many of the early water decrees, the original decrees for the Jones
Ditch and Burlington Ditch water rights did not expressly state where water application could occur or limit the number of acres irrigated under the right."
These omissions are reflections of the time period. At that time, the government had not yet completed surveys of townships and sections," making it
difficult to identify specific land to which a water right attached. The late 19th
century was also an era of rapid expansion and settlement in Colorado, which

17. See DINATALE WATER CONSULTANTS, INC., AN EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE
AGRICULTURAL WATER TRANSFER METHODS INTHE SOUTH PLATTE BASIN 59, 74 (2013) (In a
survey of 23 Colorado water utilities and water providers, the three most important factors when
considering water supply acquisitions include: 1) certainty and reliability in yield, 2) permanency
of supply, and 3) ownership of water rights.).
18. Id.; SWSI 2010, supranote 3, at 7-18.
19. See David W. Baker, Future ofDitch-Wide Change Cases in Colorado:Reducg PerShare Water Quantities uith HitoricalConsumpve Use DeterminationsBased on Unlawiul
EnlagenentandAverageReservoirReleases: Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro
Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256 P.3d 645 (Colo. 2011), 15 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 173,
174 (2011).
20. Act of Feb. 19, 1879, 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94, 99, § 19; Act of Feb. 23, 1881, 1881
Colo. Sess. Laws 142-43, S 1.
21. Act of Feb. 23,1881, 142, § 1.
22. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado's 1969 Adjudication and Adninistration Act: Settling
In, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 6 (1999) (citing Ditch Statement and Platt of the Schuttee
Ditches No. I and 2, Garfield County, Colorado (Aug. 6, 1887)) (on file with the Office of the
Colorado State Engineer).
23. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro. Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256
P.3d 645, 664 (Colo. 2011); In re Water Rights of Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 147
P.3d 9, 11 (Colo. 2006).
24. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Oveniew, 1 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 1, 10 (1997).
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water development largely fueled and supported.' Federal and state laws encouraged this growth," and early Colorado water law echoed this spirit of development and expansion. Early case law recognized that decrees entered under
the 1879 and 1881 Adjudication Acts were not designed to limit who may use
the water, but rather recognized that subsequent irrigators may join the original
appropriator under the original priority. 7 Indeed, the 1879 Adjudication Act
even permitted ditch owners to sell their water to other irrigators at a price set
by county commissioners." Lawmakers anticipated and expected expansion to
other irrigators, and presumably other farms.
The historical view of senior agricultural rights as "evolving" to include
other irrigators and additional acreage to foster early statehood development
contrasts with the contemporary realities of water rights administration that favor rights bound by some metric, such as the intent of the original appropriator.
Case law supports both approaches, although the Supreme Court generally favors the latter. In early Court decisions, volumetric limits, not specific acreage,
were the measure of a water night, but the Court eventually rejected this approach.' In 1947, the Court overruled its prior decisions permitting irrigation
of additional acreage even if users complied with the volumetric limits." In the
same decision, the Court adopted the current standard that limits the historical
use of senior agricultural rights to the water necessary to irrigate the land the
original appropriator intended to irrigate at the time of adjudication.'
Two years later, the Court justified this change, pointing to an implied limitation read into water rights decreed for irrigation that the extent of such rights
are "measured by the needs of the land for irrigation of which the water was
decreed."' The Court has since extended this implied limitation to all decrees,
25. G.E. RADosEvIci ET-AL., EvOLUTION AND ADMINISTRATION OF COLORADO WATER
LAw: 1876-1976 4-5 (1976).
26. See, e.g., Desert Lands Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (current version at 43 U.S.C.
§641-48 (2006)); Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, §9, 14 Stat. 253 (1866) (current version at 43
U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (2006)); The Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392, repealedby Pub.
L. No. 94-579, tit. VII, S 702, 90 Stat 2787 (1976); Act of Mar. 15, 1895, 1895 Colo. Sess. Laws
157-68, ch. 70.
27. See Oppenlander v. Left-Hand Ditch Co., 31 P. 854, 855-56 (Colo. 1892).
28. Act of Feb. 19, 1879, 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94-97, §§ 1-4.
29. See, e.g., Hassler v. Fountain Mut. Irrigation Co., 26 P.2d 102, 103 (Colo. 1933) ("It is
also the law that water appropriated and decreed may be applied to a larger or smaller acreage,
and on a different kind of character of land, so long as such operation does not divert a larger
quantity of water than was decreed."); Fulton Irrigation Co. v. Meadow Island Irrigation Co., 86
P. 748, 749 (Colo. 1906), abrogatedby Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood
Ditch Co., 183 P. 2d 552 (Colo. 1947) ("The mere fact that it is the intention of appellee to apply
the water, diverted from its original headgate into the new headgate and new ditch, upon a larger
acreage, does not even presumptively establish that more water, measured in time or quantity,
will be used than was diverted through the original headgate, nor will it presumptively establish
injury to the vested rights of others."); Cache La Poudre Irrigation Co. v. Larimer and Weld
Reservoir Co., 53 P. 318, 321 (Colo. 1898), abrogatedby Endarged Southside IrrIgationDitch
Co., 183 P. 2d at 552 ("An 'enlarged use' may mean that more land is being irrigated with the
same quantity of water than formerly was employed in irrigating fewer acres. It does not necessarily imply that a greater volume is required.").
30. EnlargedSouthside IriationDitch Co., 183 P. 2d at 555.
31. Id. ("In fact, the acreage under irrigation is the principal basis of measurement of the use
of water in the adjudication of priorities, and use on increased acreage of necessity is evidence,
although rebuttable, of increased use either in volume or time.").
32. Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 210 P. 2d 982, 985
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not just those for irrigation rights.' The source of this limitation is one of the
fundamental tenets of Colorado water law - the appropriative system favors optimum use by requiring water be applied for beneficial purposes." Early Colorado water laws promoted expansion of agricultural water rights to other lands,
whereas contemporary decisions espouse the desire to limit the speculative use
of water by confining such rights to the user's original intentions regarding the
number of acres irrigated.
As municipalities and water suppliers acquire more senior agricultural
rights, it is important to understand the historical context of these rights and the
constraints that limited accurate definition in original decrees. This is particularly true in light of the significant evolution of water law and the technological
advancements that have occurred since courts first entered many of these decrees. Accurate quantification of these rights is a critical stone in the path towards creating viable and efficient markets for water, which may help prevent
the forecasted widespread dry-up of agricultural land.
At the outset, it is important to define the meaning we assign to the term
"market." After all, the buying and selling of water rights is not a recent phenomenon. Municipalities have been acquiring agricultural water rights since at
least the 1890s.' However rudimentary or inefficient markets may have been,
or continue to be, markets for water do exist. Colorado is currently grappling
with how to refine its approach to water markets in order to limit or eliminate
the negative byproducts of water transfers, such as "buy and dry."'
Proposed new approaches to water transfers are generally and collectively
labeled Alternative Transfer Methods ("ATMs"). Examples include rotational
fallowing, deficit irrigation, water banks, and purchase and lease back agreements." These practices result in conserved consumptive use portions available
for lease. If the water court approves a change in use, the owner or lessee can
use conserved water for multiple purposes. The distinction between ATMs and
complete transfers of a water right from one use to another is that ATMs permit
the sharing of water associated with a particular right among various types of
beneficial uses. The focus is on the change in the type of use, not an actual
change in ownership. For this discussion, when we refer to water markets, we
refer to transfers in which several users share a given water right for multiple
types of beneficial use.
As Colorado courts strive to quantify senior rights, they simultaneously
struggle to reconcile the limitations of historic decrees with the factual development of these early rights.' The success of ATMs hinges not only on accurately
(Colo. 1949).
33. See, e.g., Orr v.Arapahoe Water and Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Colo. 1988);
Rominiecki v. McIntyre Livestock Corp., 633 P.2d. 1064, 1067 (Colo.1981); Weibert v. Rothe
Bros., Inc., 618 P. 2d 1367, 1372 (Colo. 1980).
34. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54-55 (Colo.
1999).
35. See Strickler v. City of Colo. Springs, 26 P. 313, 315 (Colo. 1891).
36. See COLO.1VATER CONSERVATION BD., NO/Low REGREIS AcrlON PLA.N 5, 7 (2013).
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id.
39. See Bruce Finley, igh Colorado Court Limits Conversion ofAg Water for Municipal
Use, DENVER PosT, May 31, 2011 ("The issue in these cases is what the historical use of water
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quantified water rights, but also on an improved process for transferring the
water rights to other uses. If we are going to attract sellers and buyers to the
water market, then the cost of transferring water through ATMs must be less
than other alternatives. The Jones Ditch and BuringtonDitch decisions recognize the efficiency of ditch-wide quantifications, but the results of these decisions - significant reductions in the quantity of certain senior water rights - has
deterred and will likely continue to deter the use of the ditch-wide methodology. 40
B. JONES D1TCH AN D B URLINGTON DITCH

The Burihngton DitchandJones Ditch decisions serve as useful case studies
that highlight the need to accurately quantify historical water rights and improve
the process for transferring such rights to other uses." Both decisions involve
change in use applications filed by owners of senior agricultural rights seeking
to change the use of the rights to either augmentation or municipal uses." In
change of use cases, courts protect against unlawful enlargement of a water right
by limiting the quantity of water that can be changed to the amount of water
historically consumed under the right.' Therefore, in change in use proceedings, the question of the right's historical consumptive use is a necessary in*44
quiry.
The effect of the Court's ruling in the Jones Ditch and Burlington Ditch
decisions was to significantly reduce the area served by senior water rights, and
thus significantly reduce the quantity of water associated with such rights.' In
both instances, the Court's interpretation of the original appropriators' intent
formed the basis of the its holding."
i. Jones Ditch
Consider the Jones Ditch case. William R. Jones was an early settler of
northern Colorado, who claimed land three miles northwest of Greeley along

is. That's a very difficult thing to prove. Old decrees were imprecise. Measurement was imprecise.
As the value of water increases, the challenge of finding just how much a person's or district's
water right might have been in the past is very difficult") (quoting the late University of Colorado
Law School Dean David Getches), available athttp://www.denverpost.com/ci_18176361#.
40. See DINATALE WATER CONSULTANTS, INC., supra note 17, at 31-32 (discussing the results of a survey of FRICO shareholders in connection with their preferences for alternative transfer mechanisms in which many respondents were reluctant to consider ATM transfers).
41. See id. at 103-04.
42. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro. Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256
P.3d 645, 655 (Colo. 2011); In re Water Rights of Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 147
P.3d 9, 12 (Colo. 2006).
43. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54-55 (Colo.
1999).
44. Williams v. Midway Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 938 P.2d 515, 522 (Colo. 1997)
("When a determination of historic usage has not previously been made, the water right must be
quantified to effectuate a change or augmentation-plan case.").
45. Burngton Ditch,256 P.3d at 665-67; Cent Colo. Water ConservancyDist, 147 P.3d at
14, 16.
46. BurligtonDitch,256 P.3d at 665-67; Cent Colo. Water ConservancyDist, 147 P.3d at
14,16.
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the Cache la Poudre River ("Poudre River") .1 Shortly after his arrival, he initiated construction on the Jones Ditch to divert water so that he could irrigate the
fertile bottomlands between the Poudre River and a line of bluffs to the south."
Mr. Jones adjudicated the ditch that bore his name in 1882." During that adjudication, Mr. Jones testified that he owned approximately 300 acres, and that
up until the time of adjudication, he had irrigated only those 300 acres." The
court entered a general decree allowing Mr. Jones to divert 931 cubic feet per
minute for irrigation ("Jones Ditch Water Right")."
In the years following entry of the decree, Mr. Jones and his successors in
interest continued development of the ditch." From 1920 to 2006, the Jones
Ditch consistently irrigated at least 700 acres."' The Jones Ditch Company, incorporated in 1944, holds the Jones Ditch Water Right for the benefit of its
shareholders."' Eventually, the Central Colorado Water Conservancy District
("Central") came to own 139 of the 200 outstanding shares in the Jones Ditch
Company."
In 2000 and 2002, Central sought to change the use of seventy-seven of its
shares from domestic and irrigation uses to irrigation, augmentation, replacement, exchange, and recreation with a right to use the consumable portion of
the water right." Thus, the lawful historic consumptive use of the water right
was at issue." Central claimed that the Jones Ditch Water Right extended to
the amount of water used to irrigate the approximately 700 acres since 1920."
Opposers claimed Central's interpretation represented an unlawful enlargement of the Jones Ditch Water Right." The District Court, Water Division No.
1 ("Water Court") agreed with the opposers.' On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed."
The Supreme Court found that Mr. Jones' testimony in the original adjudication - in which he stated that he owned "at least 300 acres that lie under the
ditch on the same side of the river that can be irrigated from this ditch" and that
he had "irrigated all of this land that needs irrigation" - was dispositive to its
determination." This statement, made over 120 years prior to Central's change
in use application, proved fatal for Central. Both the Water Court and the
Supreme Court interpreted the original appropriator's statement to indicate that

47.
2006).
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Applicant's Trial Brief at

1 5, Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 147 P.3d 9 (Colo.

Id.
Cent. Colo. Water ConservancyDist, 147 P.3d at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
Id.at 11.
Id.at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.at 14.
See id. at 17.
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the Jones Ditch Water Right was an absolute water right." Thus, both the Water Court and Supreme Court concluded that the expansion of acreage - from
the original estimation of 300 acres to the 700 acres Central claimed- constituted
an unlawful expansion of the Jones Ditch Water Right."
While the Water Court determined the extent of Central's water right on a
per-parcel basis,' the Supreme Court opted, and stated its preference, for a
ditch-wide analysis.' Under a ditch-wide approach, a court quantifies the entire
water right of a mutual ditch company and then allocates the water right among
the shareholders of the company according to their pro rata ownership of
shares." This approach contrasts with a parcel-specific (or parcel-by-parcel) approach, which quantifies consumptive use for the shares sought to be changed
to new uses without extending that value of consumptive use to other shares in
the same ditch company." When a change in use applicant seeks a change in
use pursuant to a parcel-by-parcel approach, the historic consumptive use per
changed share is generally not binding on other shareholders in that ditch company; shareholders seeking a subsequent change in use must proceed to establish the historic consumptive use with respect to the shares they wish to change.'
The law permits either a per-parcel or ditch-wide methodology, but the Court
stated that "[d] itch-wide analyses are preferable" because "they prevent expensive re-litigation of consumptive use.""o The Court also prefers ditch-wide analyses because such an approach is consistent with the pro rata operation of mutual ditch companies."
Application of the ditch-wide approach in Jones Ditch rendered the seventy-seven shares Central sought to change valueless." As discussed below, that
result may ultimately compel, and in the opinion of the authors has already
compelled, applicants in change of use cases to avoid ditch-wide quantification.
ii. BurngtonDitch

In many respects, Jones Ditchwas a prequel to the more recent Burhngton
Ditch decision. Like the Jones Ditch Water Right, water rights associated with
the Burlington Ditch, Reservoir and Land Company ("Burlington") are among

63. Id at 12, 14.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 13.
66. Id. at 18-19.
67. Id. at 19. (citing Great W. Sugar Co. v. Jackson Lake Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 681
P.2d 484, 490 (Colo. 1984)).
68. See id. at 12-13. (The Water Court, deciding to leave undisturbed a 1992 Decree in
which it awarded Central 401.4 acre-feet of consumptive use per year based on its ownership of
62 additional shares, opted for a parcel-specific analysis in which it determined the historical
consumptive use of the shares Central sought to change by analyzing the amount of water that
was historically used to irrigate 37 acres owned by Central. The Water Court awarded Central
66.65 acre feet pursuant to a parcel-specific approach).
69. See id.
70. Id. at 19.
71. See id. at 18. (In its opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court states that "shares of stock in
a mutual ditch company represent the stockholder's interest in the ditch water right" and then
discusses the allocation of a mutual ditch company's water right among its shareholders pro rata.).
72. See id. at 19-20.
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the most senior rights in Colorado, with a priority date of 1885." Though the
Colorado Supreme Court in Burhngton Ditch addressed many substantive issues, quantification of historical consumptive use was again a requisite inquiry
in this change of use case." Like JonesDitch, the outcome of Burhngton Ditch
was a dramatic reduction in the historical consumptive use of senior water rights.
Burlington, incorporated in November 1885," began construction of the
Burlington Ditch around the same time." A decree, entered in 1893 in Case
No. 11200 ("1893 Decree"), provided the company a priority date of November 25, 1885 for a direct flow right of 350 cubic feet per second ("cfs") from the
South Platte River ("Burlington 1885 Direct Flow Right") and a storage right in
Barr Lake and Oasis Reservoir to be filled at 350 cfs ("Burlington 1885 Storage
Right")."
The district court that entered the 1893 Decree adopted the referee's finding, which identified 12,000 acres capable of irrigation between the Burlington
headgate and Barr Lake and Oasis Reservoirs, as well as 28,000 acres of lands
susceptible to irrigation below these storage facilities." The decree went on to
describe, now almost notoriously, that the amount of acreage that the ditch
could serve was "unlimited as it may continue to the eastern line of Colorado.""
From 1885 until 1909, Burlington diverted approximately 200 of the 350 cfs of
the Burlington 1885 Direct Flow Right for irrigation of lands above Barr Lake."
In 1909, Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company ("FRICO") contracted
with Burlington for water "in excess of those rights [that] entitled the Burlington
Company to fill Barr/Oasis .. . and in excess of the water now obtained and
used for direct irrigation."" Diversion records showed this amount of "excess
water" was roughly the 150 cfs not then used by Burlington." FRICO delivered
this water for irrigation of lands belowBarr Lake." It was around this time that
FRICO began expanding the Burlington system, adding nearly 140 miles of new
canals as part of its Barr-Lake Division." The district court granted FRICO a
1908 priority in the expanded Burlington Canal for 600 cfs from the South
Platte."
As part of a 2004 water court application, FRICO, Burlington, Henrylyn
Irrigation District, United Water and Sanitation District, and East Cherry Creek
Valley Water and Sanitation District applied for a change in use from irrigation

73. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro. Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256
P.3d 645, 656 (Colo. 2011).
74. Id. at 662.
75. JAMEs E. SHERow, A HISTORICAL NARRATIvE OF THE BURLINGTON DITCH: RESERvOIR
AND LAND COMPANY 2 (1987), http://www.burlingtonres.com/history.htm.
76. Burngton Ditch, 256 P.3d at 656.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.at 656-57.
81. Id.at 657.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.at 657-58.
85. Id. at 657.

Issue 2

ONE STEP FORWARD AND TWO STEPS BACK

277

to municipal use of Burlington and FRICO water rights historically used to irrigate farms below Barr Lake." As in any change in use case, the analysis necessarily included a determination of the historical consumptive use of the Burlington 1885 Direct Flow Right. The Water Court held FRICO's expansion of the
Burlington system unlawful, and calculated the lawful historical consumptive
use of the Burlington 1885 Direct Flow Right as the 200 cfs Burlington put to
beneficial use prior to FRICO's expansion."
Relying in part on Jones Ditch, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed and
held that the application of water to additional acreage, resulting in increased
consumptive use above that perfected under the decreed appropriation, was
unlawful." In interpreting the nearly 120-year old decree, the Supreme Court
deferred to the Water Court's finding that there was no evidence that Burlington intended to irrigate lands below Barr Lake with the Burlington 1885 Direct
Flow Right." The Supreme Court addressed the apparent discrepancy between
its holding and the original 1893 Decree, which permitted Burlington to divert
up to 350 cfs, by concluding that a "diversion flow rate in a decree is neither the
measure of a matured water right, nor conclusive evidence of the appropriator's
need for which the appropriation was originally made.""
As in Jones Ditch, the Court in Burlington Ditch analyzed historical consumptive use according to a system-wide approach." Several parties challenged
the Water Court's ditch-wide quantification of shares not identified in the application." The Supreme Court affirmed the Water Court's approach, concluding that the resume notice was sufficient to place other Burlington and FRICO
shareholders on inquiry notice that the action may potentially affect their rights,
and that the Water Court had proper in rem jurisdiction over all water rights
under the ditch because such rights were "put at issue" by the change application."

II. ANALYSIS
Colorado is seeking to accomplish what appear to be competing goals in
water management. Colorado seeks to preserve its agricultural heritage along
with that sector's contribution to the state's economy, while concurrently acknowledging that transfers of water out of agriculture are likely to fill the projected municipal and industrial ("M&I") supply "gap"." Additional transfers of
water out of agriculture seem inevitable. But the manner in which owners transfer water rights is a policy variable upon which there is some control.
The case for policy change is an easy one to make. To protect vested water
rights holders, water courts may impose the dry-up of previously irrigated land

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 653-55.
Id.at 655.
Id.at 664-65.
Id.at 664.
Id. at 665.
See id.
at 675.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 675-76.
See SWSI 2010, supranote 3, at ES-8 and ES-16-17.
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as a condition to granting a change in use." Due to either dry-up covenants or
urban encroachment, between 500,000 and 700,000 additional irrigated acres
in Colorado could be dry by 2050." This has real economic consequences to
the state. Depending on the region and crops grown, the average economic
activity generated per irrigated acre can range from $335 to over $1200." When
lands are permanently removed from irrigated agriculture, the ripple effects can
be distressing to rural communities." In addition to being a vibrant market for
the state," agriculture also supports soil conservation, recreational opportunities, and cultural values.'" With the fate of many rural communities inextricably
tied to agriculture, and thus water, it is no surprise that there is a growing divide
among Colorado-water users.
While reallocation of water from agriculture to other uses makes up only
one leg of the so-called "four-legged stool" to meet projected future water demands in the state, such transfers comprise a considerable portion of Colorado's future water supply portfolio.' The Water Right Determination and
Adjudication Act of 1969 ("1969 Act") permits various types of temporary transfers with administrative approval.o' However such transfers may only operate
within well-defined time periods, thereby potentially constraining their ability to
facilitate sufficient water trading to address the M&I gap.'

In addition to these

95. See, e.g., City of Thornton v. Bijou Irr. Co., 926 P.2d 1, 87-88 (Colo. 1996).
96. SWSI 2010, supra note 3, at 4-32.
97. JENNIFER THORVALDSON &JAMES PRITCHETT, COLO. WATER REs. INST., REPORT No.
207, ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF REDUCED IRRIGATED ACREAGE INFOUR RIVER BASINS IN

COLo. 40 (2006).
98. See Howe & Goemans, supra note 15, at 1062-63 (discussing the economic impacts, including losses in employment, income, and tax revenue, in the Arkansas Valley of dry up associated with transfers ofwater from agriculture to municipalities); Charles W. Howe,Jeffrey K. Lazo,
& Kenneth R. Weber, The Economic Impacts ofAgriculture-to-UrbanWater Transfers on the
Area of Onpn: A Case Study of the Arkansas River Valley in Colorado, 72 AM. J. OF AGRIC.
EcON. 1200, 1200-04 (1990).
99. See generally STEPHEN DAVIES, AMALIA DAVIES, BECKY GOLDBACH, & MARTHA
SULLINS, COLO. STATE UNIV., COLO. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE CONTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURE
TO COLORADO'S ECONOMY: AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1-4 (2012), avaidable at http://www.colo-

rado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol-urldata&blobheadername l=ContentDisposition&blobheadername2=Content-Type&blobheadervalue 1 -inline%3B+filename%3D%22CSU+Executive+Sunmary.pdf%22&blobheader
value2-application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable-MungoBlobs&blobwhere= 1251833847153&ssbinary-true.
100. See, e.g., Randall S. Rosenberger & Richard G. Walsh, Nonniarket Value of Western
Valley Ranchland Using Contngent Valuation,22 J. AGRIC. & RES. EcoN. 296, 296 (1997).
101. See generallySandra K. Davis, The Politics of Water Scarcity in the Western States, 38
Soc. ScI.J. 527, 534 (2001) (discussing the factors that contribute to conflict over water).
102. See SWSI 2010, supra note 3, at 7-5 and 7-6.
103. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-9 2 -3 08(4)(a)-(c) (2012).
104. Id.(Recognizing that the time required to go through the water court adjudication process
can be problematic for some water users, the general assembly has authorized the use of substitute
water supply plans ("SWSP") to effect change applications under certain circumstances. If an
applicant has filed a change of water right application with the water court and the court has not
yet issued a decree in that matter, the applicant may request the state engineer to approve the
temporary operation of such change in water right. If the state engineer determines, after receiving comments from the opposers in the pending water court application, that the SWSP will
replace all out-of-priority depletions in time, location, and amount, and will otherwise prevent
injury to other appropriators, then the state engineer will approve the SWSP for a period of up
to one year); see also SS 37-92-308(5)(a)-(c) (A SWSP may be approved, even without a pending
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statutory transfer methods, creating markets for water leasing is one approach
that warrants attention. Markets are not a remedy to all water scarcity problems," but there is evidence that market signals are already affecting allocation
decisions.'"
Can current water transfer methods be improved to foster transactions that
meet M&I demand and curtail the buy and dry trend? The Colorado Water
Conservation Board ("CWCB") has begun to address this question through its
ATM grant program.o' The ATM studies underway point towards the development of promising concepts, many of which address the need to create incentives for water leasing. For reasons discussed below, Jones Ditch and Burlington Ditchhold lessons on the eventual efficacy of many of the ATM models.
A. PROPERTY RIGHTS
In any given transaction, property rights define the value of what is exchanged.' Water rights in Colorado challenge categorization, often straddling
the line between a private property right and a public good." The public nature
of water is cemented in the Colorado Constitution.'o However, the prior appropriation system recognizes usufructuary rights in water held by private individuals and entities.'' The act of appropiriation, through control and application
of water to a beneficial use, entitles the appropriator to make use of that amount
of water in subsequent years."
The extent of the private right to use water, like many other natural resources, is limited and presents a unique bundle of rights."' These rights are
subject to the well-established condition that the water must be applied to a nonspeculative use."' The right holder must continue to divert water once there is
lawful appropriation, or risk a finding of abandonment (commonly known as
the "use it or lose it" condition)." Adjudicated water rights give the appropriator the right to the continued use of a certain amount of water at a specified
change in water right application in water court, for a limited duration of up to five years); § 3792-309 (Interruptible water supply agreements ("IWSA")allow for approval by the state engineer
of temporary transfers of the consumptive use portions of absolute water rights to another beneficial use, without adjudication, if the proponent can prove the agreement will not cause injury to
other appropriators. An IWSA can be exercised in no more than three years in a ten year period).
105. See Dellepenna, supra note 5, at 36-37 (discussing exernalities in water markets); Howe,
Schurmeier & Shaw, Jr., supra note 5, at 441 (discussing exernalities in water markets).
106. jedidiah Brewer, Robert Glennon, Alan Ker, & Gary Libecap, 2006PresidentalAddress
Water Markets i the West: Prices, Trading,and ContractualForns,46 EcoN. INQUIRY 91, 105
(2008) (summarizing water markets in the Western U.S. from 1987 to 2005).
107. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., ALTERNATIVE AGRICUUIURAL WATER TRANSFER
METHODS GRANT PROGRAM SUMMARY AND STATUS UPDATE 1-2 (2012).

108. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Proper0' Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REV. 347, 347
(1967).
109. See MacDonnell,supra note 9, at 2, 5; Smith, supranote 9, at 466-68.
110. COLO. CONsT. art XVI, § 5.
111. See Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colo. 1982).
112. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(2), (3)(a) (2013).
113. See Smith, supra note 9, at 468-70.
114. See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d
566, 568 (Colo. 1979).
115. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Purgatoire River Water Conservancy Dist., 515 P.2d 456, 457-58
(Colo. 1973) (nonuse in conjunction with intent to abandon result in the loss of a water right).
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place, for a particular purpose, and in priority."' Once applied, the water right
owner has no right to claim unappropriated return flows; once applied, that
water belongs to another appropriator."'
But the ultimate measure of an owner's private right in water - historical
consumptive use ("HCU") - is generally not fixed until the owner seeks to transfer the right to a different use."' Along with a water right's priority, quantification
of HCU is the primary stick in the bundle that defines the value of the right for
transfer because HCU is the true quantitative measure of a water right."'
Consistent with the requirement that a change in use of a water right cause
no injury to junior appropriators, HCU is the quantity of water an owner historically withdrew and consumed by application of the water to a decreed beneficial use"' and, therefore, is water that was historically unavailable to supply other
appropriators. As described in the next section, quantification of HCU is neither simple nor inexpensive, particularly when the right an owner seeks to
change was historically used in irrigation.'
B. TRANSACTIONS COSTS

For water transfers, transaction costs are those costs associated with identifying opportunities for trade, negotiating transfers, monitoring, and potential
mitigation of third party effects and conveyance."' The transaction costs incurred in obtaining legal approval to effect the proposed change in water right
are of particular importance.'" As discussed above, quantification of HCU
takes on great significance in a change in use application.
A lack of accurate data can impede determination of HCU for changes of
use involving agricultural water rights.'' Determination of HCU requires assemblage of historic diversion records, which are generally available from the state.
The courts also require historical data regarding the types of crops grown and
the number of acres irrigated.'" In addition, HCU determination requires techniques like the Blaney-Criddle method, which incorporate data regarding tem-

116. Eg., Navajo Dev. Co., 655 P.2d at 1377; George A. Gould, WaterRights Transfersand
7&rd-PartyEffects, 23 Wyo. LAND &WATER L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1988) [hereinafter Gould II.
117. Comstock v. Ramsay, 133 P. 1107, 1111 (Colo. 1913) (It is a well-recognized principle
of Colorado water law, that under our priority system, waters remaining after the application to a
beneficial use "belong once again to the river system at the moment they are released by the
user ... and start to flow back to the river.").
118. See Smith, supra note 9, at 469-70.
119. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54-55 (Colo.
1999).
120. Id.
121. James N. Corbridge, Jr., HistoricalWater Use and the Protection of Vested Rights: A
Challengefor Colorado Water Law,69 U. CoLo. L. REV. 503, 524-26 (1998).
122. Laura McCann & K. William Easter, A Framework for EstiLnatngthe TransactionCosts
ofAltemative Mechanismsfor Water Exchange and Allocation, 40 1VATER RES. RESEARCH 1, 2
(2004).
123. Colby, supra note 12, at 1184.
124. See Gould I, supra note 116, at 20.
125. Corbridge, supra note 117, at 524.
126. George A. Gould, Transferof WaterRights,29 NAT. REs.J. 457,464 (1989) [hereinafter
Gould II.
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perature, sunshine, climatological data, and consumptive use coefficients to estimate crop consumption, evapotranspiration, and evaporation.' Water courts
must also determine ditch loss, as water lost through seepage in the ditch is not
consumed and instead finds it way back to the tributary surface system.'" The
costs associated with such quantification can affect market activity.'" This may
even limit market efficiency or prevent market formation altogether."o Research
suggests such costs push M&I water market participants away from the acquisition of previously-decreed native water and towards the market for foreign water
delivered through existing projects."'
In contrast, consider the market for units of Colorado-Big Thompson Project ("C-BT") water, which the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
("NCWCD") oversees. Several unique qualities of C-BT units attract M&I providers. First, although use of the water may only occur within NCWCD boundaries, units may be transferred among users without the need for a return flow
analysis.'" Further, C-BT unit transfers are generally not subject to water court
scrutiny, thereby considerably reducing the transactions costs associated with
transferring units.I' Lastly, C-BT units are homogenous as each share gets the
same amount of water.'3
By several accounts, the market for C-BT units is one of the better functioning water markets in the Western U.S.'" By number of transactions, it is one
of the most active water markets.'" The relative ease with which water is transferred fosters continual trading, as opposed to markets for native water in which
M&I providers tend to "buy ahead."'. Because the development of new supplies is one of the four legs of the stool to address the M&I gap,' we could
possibly see markets similar to the C-BT market arise with the completion of
new supply projects. But such projects are expensive and take considerable

Gould I, supra note 116, at 20.
See Gould II, supm note 126, at 465.
129. Gould'I, supra note 116, at 23.
130. Colby, supra note 12, at 1184.
131. NICHOlS ET AL., supa note 14, at 146-47. Native water is to be distinguished from foreign or "developed water." Id. Developed water "is that water which has been added to the
supply of a natural stream and which never would have come into the stream had it not been for
the efforts of the party producing it ... It follows that the developers without hindrance could
use, re-use, make successive use of and dispose of the water." City of Denver exrel. Bd. of Water
Comm'rs v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144, 147 (Colo. 1972); see also COLO. REv.
STAT. § 37-82-106 (2013).
132. See Estes Park v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 677 P.2d 320, 324 (Colo. 1984)
(discussing Article 19 of the contract between NCWCD and the U.S. in which the latter reserved
for the benefit of the former all return flows for domestic, irrigation, and industrial uses).
133. Howe & Goemans, supra note 15, at 1056.
134. Id.
135. David S. Brookshire, Bonnie Colby, Mary Ewers, & Philip T. Ganderton, MarketPrices
127.
128.

for Water n the Semnand West of the United States, 40 WATER REs. RESEARCH 1, 7 (2004)

("[Tihe CBT system of shares provide the simplest property rights structure to support market
trades. The homogeneity of the right is the key characteristic that separates the water right from
location, owner type, and historical use.").
136. Brown, supra note 6, at 3.
137. Howe & Goemans, supra note 15, at 1060.
138. SWSI 2010, supra note 3, at 7-4.
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time to plan, construct, and permit." In the meantime, we could proactively
take the lessons learned from the C-BT market and translate them to improve
the market for native water.
Shares in mutual ditch companies are capable.of replicating some of these
attributes, particularly when using a ditch-wide quantification approach. Determining the HCU attributable to each share in one proceeding results in homogeneity of shares, one of the qualities that economists have concluded improves
the functionality of the C-BT market. Additionally, and as the C-BT market
shows, a ditch-wide quantification would reduce future transaction costs and
create incentives for trade.
C. INCENTIVES FOR WATER TRANSFERS AFTERJONEsDITCHAND
BURLrVGTON DITCH

If part of Colorado's water portfolio to meet future water demand requires
reliance on ATMs to prevent large scale dry up of agricultural land, then it is
fair to evaluate the incentives for would-be ATM participants to engage in water
markets. An analysis of the Burhngton DitchandJones Ditch decisions reveals,
at best, mixed incentives for the development of temporary transfers.
As alluded to above, these decisions encourage the development of water
markets by recognizing the efficiency gains of ditch-wide quantifications. Ideally, the result of such an approach is twofold: (I) the homogenization of shares
in a given ditch company, which allows each share to represent a right to use a
certain amount of water under the same priority, and (II) reductions in the transaction costs associated with quantifying HCU. The two go hand-in-hand. It is
easier to imagine the potential for water trades when the buyer and seller are
certain as to the amount of water being traded before seeking water court approval. If the market for C-BT units is a comparison, then both of these results
are important with respect to their potential to create incentives for water trading.
Though the Colorado Supreme Court expressed a preference for the ditchwide approach, the outcome of both the BurlingtonDitch andJonesDitchcases
established incentives to avoid such an approach. Both decisions point towards
one conclusion: after more than a century of precedent and statutory development, property rights to water are still poorly defined in Colorado. No market,
for water or otherwise, can be expected to form without well-defined property
rights." Our state goes to great lengths to define the nature of water rights, but
does so only indirectly - by parameters that define its use."' If water markets
are to function, the bundle of sticks comprising a water right must include how
much of that right is transferrable. Ideally, this component would attach to a
139. See id. at 7-21 (discussing factors to consider for new supply development strategy concepts); see adso Gould II, supra note 126, at 457-58 (noting the financial implications of new water
development projects).
140. Eg., Terry L. Anderson & PJ. Hill, The Evolution of PropertyRights: A Study of the
Anerican West, 18J.L. & EcoN. 163, 178 (1975) (noting that well-defined property rights led to
greater enforceability); Gould I, supra note 116, at 24 ("Well-defined rights are one of the essentials for an efficient market.").
141. See Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro. Wastewater Reclamation Dist.,
256 P.3d 645 (Colo. 2011); In re Water Rights of Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 147
P.3d 9 (Colo. 2006).
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water right prior to a change in use proceeding.
The Court's attempts to define the consumptive use of a water right in BurAngton Ditch andJones Ditchmuddied the waters further. In Jones Ditch, the
Court founded its determination of consumptive use on analysis of the original
appropriator's intent. In that case, the 120-year old testimony of William R.
Jones was controlling as to the quantification of HCU."' Similarly, the Court's
decision to nearly halve Burlington's 1885 Direct Flow Right turned on the applicants' inability to demonstrate Burlington's intent over a century ago to irrigate lands below Barr Lake."' Now, when transferring an agricultural water
right, the proponent must not only demonstrate compliance with all of the other
parameters used to describe a water right - nonspeculative, continuous use,
from an approved point of diversion, applied to the decreed type(s) of use, etc.
- the proponent must also provide evidence that the amount to be transferred
was applied to lands the original appropriator intended to irrigate. Surely, these
decisions sent the boards of directors of ditch companies and the attorneys that
represent them scouring historical files to determine if they could meet such a
burden. Burlington Ditch and Jones Ditch did more to increase uncertainty
with respect to water rights, thus chilling the development of water trading.
D. THE "LEGACY DITCH BILL"
Recent legislation introduces certainty into senior agricultural water rights.
The Legacy Ditch Bill provides that the lawful maximum amount of irrigated
acreage for decrees entered prior to 1937, and which are silent as to the number
of acres the appropriator may irrigate, is the maximum amount of acreage irrigated (in compliance with all other provisions of the decree) during the first fifty
years after entry of the decree."' This statute's operation is akin to statutes of
limitation. It creates a presumption that even allegedly unlawful right expansions through historical diversions that have gone unchallenged by the State Engineer or other water users are indeed lawful.
Similar legislation has protected other rights, notably those in property.
Colorado recognizes an 18-year limitation on real property claims." This and
other statutes of limitation strike a balance between affording an opportunity for
redress and the need to protect against the risk of error about the merits of stale
claims when evidence may be difficult to obtain because it has been lost, memories have faded, or witnesses have disappeared or are deceased."' In sum,
statutes of limitation offer certainty. In a commercial setting, such certainty fosters investment and market activity." This is the essence of the Legacy Ditch
Bill - to offer sufficient time for contesting assertions of unlawful enlargement,
while simultaneously protecting longstanding uses of water from ancient claims.
Such certainty alleviates the surprise water rights owners (or prospective purchasers) experience when their rights are suddenly rendered valueless.
142. Cent. Colo. Water ConservatoryDist, 147 P.3d at 17.
143. BurlngtonDitch, 256 P.3d at 664.
144. COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-92-305(4)(a)(I)(B) (2013).
145. Id. at § 38-41-101(1).
146. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
147. Tyler T. Ochoa & AndrewJ. Wistrich, The Puzzhg Purposes ofStatutes ofLinitation,
28 PAc. Lj. 453, 467 (1997).
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The Legacy Ditch Bill is a step towards defining that all-important stick in
the bundle for agricultural water - HCU. Knowing that certain senior agriculture water rights have some protection from claims of unlawful expansion, like
those at issue in Burlngton Ditch andJonesDitch,restores value to those rights
and lets market participants confidently enter into transactions for those rights.

m.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Supreme Court has identified ditch-wide quantifications as the most
efficient and viable means to quantify senior irrigation rights to permit additional
uses."' However, unanswered questions remain. This section discusses three
commonly expressed questions regarding ditch-wide quantification in the wake
of Jones Ditch, Burlington Ditch, and the adoption of the Legacy Ditch Bill,
and provides preliminary responses to these concerns.
A. WILL QUANTIFICATION ACCELERATE BuY AND DRY?

If the goal of ditch-wide quantifications is to facilitate future transfers of water, a reasonable argument exists that such a method will only accelerate buy
and dry. That is, it is good to have barriers to protect existing agricultural water
because M&I providers acquiring agricultural rights ought to bear the burden
of proving HCU of the water rights they acquire. Otherwise, it would become
much easier for water to leave agriculture. This is a valid concern.
Ditch-wide quantifications are not a panacea to solve all allocation problems
and, acting alone, they cannot be expected to overcome the underlying reasons
for widespread buy and dry. But, further analysis provides hope that ditch-wide
quantifications are a step in the right direction. Colorado's current system for
water transfers appears to promote, or at least contribute to, buy and dry. Due
to economies of scale, M&I suppliers acquiring water tend to "buy ahead."'
Under current conditions, this is a rational position. M&I suppliers need to
secure enough water to justify the expense as transaction costs increase. If a
transaction yields more water than a municipality needs in the short term, the
municipality is protected because it can always lease water back to the ditch
company.
Ditch-wide quantifications can offer a way to reduce the buying-ahead phenomenon. -If the costs associated with acquiring ditch shares can be lowered
because the transferrable amount (i.e., the HCU) of the shares has already been
determined, M&I suppliers can better align their water acquisitions with their
near-term anticipated demand. Again, turning to the market for C-BT units for
a reference, there is evidence that transfers of CB-T units are much smaller than
traditional water rights transfers."'o Low transaction costs allow continual trading
rather than the occasional large transfer.''
The next logical question is: Won't this lead to a death by a thousand paper
cuts? Is the result the same'- water leaving agriculture bound for urban use?
Are we just delaying the inevitable? This is an area where the CWCB's ATM
148. See Cent. Colo. Water Conservatory Dist. v. City of Greely, 147 P.3d 9, 19 (Colo. 2006).
149.

Howe & Goemans, supranote 15, at 1059-60.
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grant program can prove helpful by devising long-term options for water markets. Successful water markets need the flexibility to allow M&I users and irrigators to share water under the same right. Such proposals could restore balance in water allocation by giving agricultural users a viable alternative to selling
their entire water right. Middle ground does exist. But, our current approach
has failed at finding it. Whether through extended-period water leases, water
banks, rotational fallowing, or other ATM concepts, the road to greater water
sharing, and thus more water remaining in agriculture, must lead through quantification. Accomplishing quantification on a wider scale through the ditch-wide
method opens the door for more participants in ATM-type programs.
B. WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS TO NON-CHANGING SHAREHOLDERS?

Colorado has long recognized the right to change the use of an established
water right as a fundamental stick in the bundle of rights that make up a valuable
usufractuary right, subject to the condition that such a change may not injure
other appropriators." Similarly, this general rule has long applied to shareholders in a mutual ditch company." As owners of a portion of the underlying
senior water right decreed for irrigation, shareholders enjoy the right to change
the use of their shares.' When they do so, however, the mutual ditch company
- a non-profit entity charged with delivering each shareholder its pro rata portion of the water right'" - is faced with challenges arising out of the novel characteristics of the changed portion of the right. Suppose a water court imposes
special terms and conditions upon the exercise of the right for the new use that
may impact shareholders other than the shareholder seeking the new use. This
imposition and extension of terms to non-changing shareholders creates questions regarding the ability of the changing shareholder to initiate a process that
could affect others in the ditch. Assuming such a proceeding is lawful, the extent of notice and participation by the mutual ditch company and/or other
shareholders is also questionable. The contractual nature of the mutual ditch
company and its resultant ability to impose reasonable restrictions on the diversion and use of the senior water right create another layer of potential complication. Colorado's water community must adequately address these questions
if the ditch-wide quantification approach is to be adopted on a broad scale.
i. Notice: How Much is Required?
If a shareholder or group of shareholders is going to request a change in
place or type of use that could have effects upon non-changing shareholders
and the operation of the mutual ditch company as a whole, it is imperative that
the ditch company and the non-changing shareholders receive full and fair notice and opportunity to participate in the water court process. Colorado has
existing laws and procedures to address this concern as it relates to individual

152.
153.
154.
155.

E.g., Strickler v. City of Colo. Springs, 26 P. 313, 316 (Colo. 1891).
E.g., Wadsworth Ditch Co. v. Brown, 88 P. 1060, 1061 (Colo. 1907).
Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Catlin Canal Co., 642 P.2d 501, 509 (Colo. 1982).
Id. at 508.
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shareholders - monthly resume publication in each water division.'" The purpose of the resume notice is to alert all other water users to an application that
could affect their rights.' In BurlingtonDitch, the Court addressed challenges
to the Water Court's jurisdiction by analyzing the sufficiency of the resume notice."' Thus, the Court has adopted and recently used this approach.
If their bylaws permit, ditch companies have the right to approve a change
in use application prior to shareholder filing and to insist upon terms and conditions that protect the company and the non-changing shareholders.' If the
ditch company's board properly exercises this power, it may eliminate the need
for both the ditch company and individual shareholders to appear in the water
court to protect their rights.
In the change of use context, determination of HCU by a ditch-wide approach will, by definition, affect other shareholders in the system. Courts will
analyze questions regarding diversion patterns, ditch loss, administration, and
others and reflect such issues in a decree. As discussed below, the outcomes of
these prior decisions may bind other shareholders in subsequent cases. For any
water court application, the resume notice must contain the name and address
of the applicant, a description -ofthe water right involved, and a description of
the ruling sought.' If the applicant provides this information and publishes it
in the resume such that other parties have at least inquiry notice - i.e., that level
of notice sufficient to reveal to potential parties the nature of the claim being
made so they can decide whether to conduct further inquiry into the full extent
of those claims and whether to participate - the notice requirement is satisfied
such that the Court has proper in rem jurisdiction to decide the case.'
ii. Can Non-changing Shareholders be Bound?
Another question that must be addressed is whether and to what extent a
single shareholder, or subset of shareholders, in a mutual ditch company may
unilaterally request a change in type or place of use that results in findings of
fact or law that are binding upon non-changing shareholders. For ditch-wide
quantifications to realize their anticipated benefit - primarily gains in efficiency
- the answer to this question should be yes. As co-owners of a larger water right,
it is not unreasonable to expect that shareholders in a ditch company may, from
time to time, initiate actions that bind other shareholders. This expectation is
incident to co-ownership. Determination of HCU in an earlier proceeding
should be preclusive on that issue in subsequent cases, absent changed circumstances.
156. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-302(3)(a)-(b) (2012).
157. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 24-25 (Colo. 1996); Monaghan
Farms, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 807 P.2d 9, 17 (Colo. 1991).
158. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256
P.3d 645, 675-76 (Colo. 2011) ("The resume in both cases was sufficient to place parties on
notice: they contained detailed information on the water rights at issue, the location of the structures, to which those rights were decreed, and the scope and impact of the decree sought.").
159. FortLyon CamalCo., 642 P.2d at 506-07.
160. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(3)(a) (2012); see also Bjou IrrationCo., 926 P.2d at 26
(inadequate resume notices are those "characterized by the complete absence of material information concerning the disputed water rights.").
161. Burngton Ditch, 256 P.3d at 674-75, 677.
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Shareholders in a ditch company are co-owners of the senior water right
they allocate among themselves.'" Such shareholders have chosen to enter this
co-ownership relationship on a contractual basis with other shareholders. In
other contexts, Colorado law recognizes the right of a co-owner to initiate a judicial proceeding that binds other co-owners. Consider the right of a co-owner
in real property to initiate an action for partition.'" In some respects, a ditchwide quantification can be analogized to such a partition action. Similar to the
rights of co-owners in real property, shareholders in a ditch company should
reasonably expect that other shareholders will commence actions that have the
potential to affect the non-changing shareholder's interest, particularly where
shareholders submit change in use applications requiring quantification of the
water right sought to be changed.
The Colorado Supreme Court has consistently approved of the principle
that a prior determination of HCU should have preclusive effect in a later action.' The proper application of issue preclusion can reduce transaction costs
in subsequent determinations because application of the doctrine saves the proponent in a later change in use case from having to put on evidence regarding
HCU.'" The application of issue preclusion is not without its limits. One such
limit becomes apparent when circumstances have changed since the previous
determination." The Supreme Court has applied this exception to reopen previous decrees to determine injury resulting from enlarged use,'" but the Court
has not extensively tested the exception in change in use cases involving ditchwide quantification. We suspect that future cases will refine the extent of this
exception.

162. Farmer's Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 799, 807 (Colo.
2001); Jacobucci v. Cnty. of Jefferson, 541 P.2d 667, 672 (Colo. 1975).
163. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-28-101 (2013).
164. High Plains A& M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist, 120 P.3d 710, 723 (Colo.
2005) ("Second, we have held that a sufficient ditch-wide historic consumptive use analysis in a
change of water right case can be utilized in another change case for allocation of the amount of
water to which the mutual company shareholder is entitled"); Williams v. Midway Ranches Prop.
Owners Ass'n, Inc., 938 P.2d 515, 526 (Colo. 1997) ("However, when historical usage has been
quantified for the ditch system by previous court determination, the yield per share which can be
removed for use in an augmentation plan is not expected to differ from augmentation case to
augmentation case . . . ."); FarmersReservoir & Ingation Co., 33 P.3d at 807 ("Once the Water
Court has adopted a methodology for determining an appropriation's historic beneficial consumptive use and has made allocations of consumptive use based thereon, that methodology and
those allocations are normally expected to govern future change proceedings involving the same
water right.").
165. Hgh PlainsA & M, 120 P.3d at 723 ("Appropriate implementation of claim and issue
preclusion prevents expensive relitigation of historical consumptive use in transfer after transfer
involving the same ditch or reservoir system"); Midway Ranches, 938 P.2d at 525 ("The water
court may take judicial notice of its prior determinations and decrees in historic use, change, and
augmentation plan cases involving the same water right The creation of water divisions and the
appointment of water judges on a watershed basis to make findings of fact and conclusions of law
necessarily anticipates reliance on prior judgments and decrees as to noticed, adjudicated claims
regarding a water right.").
166. Farmers High Line Canal v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189, 200-01 (Colo. 1999); Midway
Ranches, 938 P.2d at 526.
167. Eg., FarmersHh Line Canal,975 P.2d at 200-01.
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iii. How Should Consumptive Use be Distributed among Shareholders?
Assuming a ditch-wide analysis quantifies the consumptive use by the entire
senior irrigation right, how should shareholders divide that consumptive use?
At first blush, the answer to this question seems obvious: ditch companies
should distribute consumptive use and diversions pro rata. However, the details
of HCU analyses and the vagaries of mutual ditch company administration
cloud this seemingly straightforward approach.
Some preliminary examples aid the analysis. In simple terms, consider two
ditch systems - one "water short" and one "water long." In the water short ditch
system, average crop demand consistently exceeds average available water supply under the senior water right. In such a system, shareholders suffer shortages
and are more likely to demand their full pro rata portion of the senior right.
Under these conditions, administration is often supervised; shareholder headgates may have measuring devices, shareholders are required to call for or place
orders for water, and the ditch rider or ditch Superintendent plays an active role
in ensuring that each shareholder receives their pro rata portion.
In contrast, in the water long ditch, average available supplies diverted under the senior irrigation right exceed average crop demand under the ditch.
Plenty of water is available and shareholders are unlikely to consistently demand
a full pro rata portion of the senior right. Instead, they will deliver the amount
necessary to meet the demands of the crops, which often constitutes an amount
less than the pro rata entitlement. For obvious reasons, administration within
the water long ditch is likely to be less stringent; farm headgates may not have
measuring devices, shareholders are permitted to open and close their headgates at will rather than relying upon the ditch superintendent.
In reality, ditch administration is more complicated than the simple water
short and water long examples imply. Three factors increase the level of complexity. First, few ditches are water short or water long all the time. Ditches
may be water long in the spring when the runoff is occurring, water short in midsummer when the ditch is subject to a senior call, and water long again in the
fall. So, the question of whether a ditch is water long or water short must itself
be answered with a temporal question- when?
Second, few ditches deliver water to all shareholders all the time. Even in
predominately water short systems, farming practices may dictate delivery to
only a portion of the shareholders at a given time. Crops, cultivation, and irrigation methods can all vary under a ditch. For example, a farmer using a center
pivot irrigation system may demand water only when the system is nmning, a
farmer cutting hay will not deliver water to the field, while depending upon its
size and soil type or precipitation events, a furrow-irrigated corn field may be
saturated and in need of several days without water. As a result of factors like
these, less than all headgates are likely to be taking water at a given time. When
some headgates are closed, the remaining open headgates will divide available
water between them and each will receive more than its pro rata entitlement for
that day. In this sense, many ditch companies may be truly "mutual" in the
sense that the shareholders use one another's pro rata portions on a given day.
Ideally, as the irrigators take turns using one another's water, deliveries approach a pro rata amount over the course of an irrigation season.
The third complexity arises out of the size and water demand of individual

Issue 2

ONE STEP FOR WARD AND TWO STEPS BACK

289

farms within a system. Regardless of whether a ditch system is water short or
water long as a whole, individual farms within the system may be water short or
water long depending upon the number of shares used to irrigate each farm.
Within a given ditch system, farmers own a specific number of shares entitling
them to an identified portion of the diversions of the senior right."' For example, in a ditch company with 100 shares and a 100 cfs water right, each share
would be entitled to one cfs, less ditch loss, expressed as a flow rate, or 1/100'
of diversions over the course of the irrigation season, expressed as a volume. A
shareholder owning five shares would be entitled to five cfs, or 5/100' of the
diversions in acre-feet. Now assume the lands irrigated by this ditch consist of
a patchwork of individually owned parcels of varying sizes. In general terms,
shareholders will have a sense for how much acreage a single share will irrigate.
In the present example, it could be that one share, which entitles a shareholder
to one cfs, will irrigate eighty acres so that a shareholder owning eighty acres and
one share could be expected to produce a crop.
In an ideal world, each irrigator would own precisely the number of shares
necessary to irrigate lands that he or she owns. In reality, this is not the case.
Shares are bought and sold between shareholders, parcels are divided and sold.
As a result, farms end up with an unequal number of shares per acre. For
example, it is possible that a 240-acre farm may have one share associated with
it, while the neighboring eighty-acre farm has three shares. Using the present
example, this would mean that the 240-acre farm would be dramatically water
short, while the eighty-acre farm would be dramatically water long, regardless of
whether the ditch system itself was considered water short or water long. In
actual operation, it is unlikely that the eighty-acre farm received a full pro rata
amount, literally flooding the crops, while the neighboring 240-acre farm received less than the amount necessary to grow a crop. Instead, the eighty-acre
farm took what it needed, which was less than the pro-rata amount attributable
to three shares, and the 240-acre farm picked up the excess from the eighty-acre
farm and used more than its pro-rata amount.
To illustrate the issues these variables raise in the context of a ditch-wide
change in use application, assume that on a system-wide basis the consumptive
use associated with each share is fifty acre-feet. The simplest ditch-wide analysis
assumes that each shareholder received a pro rata delivery of water, eliminating
variability like that described above between the eighty- and 240- acre farms.
Historically, the 240-acre farm consumed 150 acre-feet per year, while the
eighty-acre farm consumed fifty acre-feet per year. The question arises as to
who is entitled to the benefit of the consumptive use that occurred by the delivery of the eighty-acre farm's shares to the 240-acre farm? Using share ownership, the eighty-acre farm owner, as owner of three shares, should be entitled to
150 acre-feet, while the 240-acre farm owner would be entitled to fifty acre-feet.
At the same time, the three-share owner, as the owner of that specified portion
of the senior water right, did not use it. Instead, it was the one-share owner that
invested the time and effort necessary to secure the consumptive use. How
should the mutual ditch company address this issue? How would the law address it if the mutual ditch company does not provide guidance?

168. Jacobucci v. Cnty. ofJefferson, 541 P.2d 667, 672 (Colo. 1975).
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As an additional layer, consider the frequent water court term and condition requiring the party changing the use of a senior irrigation right to dry up or
cease irrigating the acreage historically irrigated by the right." Can the threeshare, eighty-acre owner force the 240-acre owner to cease irrigating? If the
system is voluntary, and allows the 240-acre owner to "sell" dry up acreage, is it
fair that the three-share owner should theoretically have the benefit of 150 acrefeet, but lose the value as a practical matter out of the necessity to pay the 240acre owner for dry up acreage? The latter result could strike many mutual ditch
company shareholders as unfair because it essentially punishes those within the
ditch system that had the foresight to acquire sufficient shares to irrigate and
rewards those who fanned 'on the cheap' by relying upon others' excesses.
Mutual ditch companies should be prepared for these questions to arise m
the context of a ditch- wide analysis and be ready to develop bylaws or policies
that fairly distribute the consumptive use attributable to each share. The answers to these questions will vary with each ditch company, depending upon the
facts and circumstances. The important thing is that companies recognize the
questions, and move proactively to address them.
C. WHAT IS THE ROLE FOR CATLIN BYLAWS AND INTERNAL
REGULATION?

Mutual ditch companies' ability to impose reasonable regulations upon the
exercise of shareholders' pro rata portion of the water right presents the best
avenue for companies to address the questions raised in this section and thrive
in a new era of ditch-wide quantification. Colorado ditch companies occupy a
unique corner of the law. Though some similarities exist between ownership
of shares in a ditch company and shares in a general corporation, the analogy
breaks down because of the distinctive nature of ditch companies."' It is not a
trust relationship."' The relationship is one formed in contract.'" Nonetheless,
the ditch company, formed largely out of the necessity to share in the monumental task of constructing ditches in Colorado's early history, still remains a
"vehicle by which its owners operate and manage its affairs."'
In the context of a change in use proceeding, shareholders have the same
right as other appropriators to change the place of use, subject to the no-injury
standard."' In the context of such a change, ditch companies are not merely
bystanders; they have the authority to impose reasonable limitations, beyond
those contained in the 1969 Act, upon a shareholder seeking to obtain a change
in their water right." "Catlin Bylaws," named after the Colorado Supreme
Court case that approved them"', are the proper venue for resolving questions
surrounding the appropriateness of a ditch-wide quantification for a particular
company.
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City of Thornton v. Bijou Irr. Co., 926 P2.d 1, 87 (Colo. 1996).
Jacobucci v. Cnty. ofJefferson, 541 P.2d 667, 672 (Colo. 1975).
Id. at 673.
Id. at 672 (citing Supply Ditch Co. v.Elliott, 15 P. 691 (Colo. 1887)).
Id. (quoting Billings Ditch Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 253 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Colo. 1953)).
E.g., Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Catlin Canal Co., 642 P.2d 501, 509 (Colo. 1982).
Id. at 508-09.
Id.

ONE STEP FOR WARD AND TWO STEPS BACK

Issue 2

291

The Court approved the most basic form of a Catlin Bylaw in FortLyon
CanalCo.v. Catih Canal Co., which requires shareholders to receive company
approval prior to filing a water court or administrative change in use application."' These bylaws may require the shareholder to present a complete application, including supporting engineering and a proposed water court application, to the ditch company board of directors for review prior to filing. The
bylaw may also require the shareholder requesting the change in use to make a
deposit to the company to offset the legal and engineering costs of review. Review of the application gives the mutual ditch company board the opportunity
to consider the potential impact of the application upon non-changing shareholders and the company. A mutual ditch company may condition approval
on compliance with terms and conditions reasonably necessary to protect other
shareholders and the company from injury. Mutual ditch company boards
should be careful to strike a balance between the tension between the individual
shareholder's right to change the use of his or her portion of the right and the
rights of non-changing shareholders to continue irrigation practices. The Catlin
Bylaw power is not without limitation and should be exercised judiciously to
preserve its potency.
Since the relationship between shareholders in a mutual ditch company is
grounded in contract, it is possible that the bylaws could address many other
issues. For example, regardless of how the General Assembly or water court
handles the notice issue, the bylaws could require a shareholder seeking to implement a ditch-wide change in use to personally notify all other shareholders.
Likewise, a bylaw could address issues of how to allocate consumptive use and
how to distribute dry-up. Companies with foresight could agree beforehand
how to process a ditch-wide application, from its inception to prosecution, on
fundamental terms and conditions, and to create a cost-sharing mechanism
within the ditch for those that benefit from its provisions. The Catlin Bylaw
power mutual ditch companies enjoy allows those closest to the right - its owners - to establish reasonable parameters for a ditch-wide quantification.
CONCLUSION
Large-scale quantification of senior irrigation rights is a prerequisite to the
development of effective and efficient water markets in Colorado. Assigning
consumptive use amounts and standardized terms and conditions for new uses
of the changed rights, in addition to the historical irrigation usage, opens the
door to new modes of agricultural-urban water sharing. It has the potential to
reduce the pressure for M&I users to buy and dry Colorado's farms. The Colorado Supreme Court has identified ditch-wide quantifications as the most efficient means of achieving quantification. The current legal and regulatory environment can provide notice and adjudicate ditch-wide quantification and
produce equitable results. Mutual irrigation companies should move proactively to address key questions and develop ditch-specific policies to guide quantification..
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